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Introduction 
The United States contains more than 80,000 
separate governmental units. If none of  these 
units overlapped, each government would serve 
fewer than 2,000 individuals. Governmental 
units do overlap, however, resulting in several 
layers of  jurisdictions. Residents within a metro- 
politan area typically receive public services 
from a municipality, a township, a county, and a 
host of special districts. 
In addition, at each level of government, 
several similar governmental units may provide 
services within the same geographical area. For 
example, the Chicago metropolitan area alone 
contains more than 250 municipalities, each 
responsible for the same array of governmental 
functions. Overlapping these governments are 
835 special districts, which usually perform only 
a single function, such as providing regional 
transportation or enforcing environmental pro- 
tection regulations. 
The impact of this structure on government 
behavior is varied, and the net effects are not yet 
fully understood. Critics of the decentralized 
structure of local governments blame the pro- 
liferation of  local governments for what they see 
to be "runaway" spending. They argue that 
duplication of efforts by similar but independent 
jurisdictions within the same geographical area 
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is an inefficient way to provide public services 
and that the resulting fragmentation could ne- 
gate any benefits derived from economies of 
scale. 
Proponents of a decentralized public sector 
counter with the argument that it fosters 
increased efficiency in the production of public 
goods. They maintain that competitive pres- 
sures induce local governments to adopt the 
most efficient provision techniques and to tailor 
the levels of provision of  public goods to the 
preferences of societal subgroups (Oates [1972]). 
The phenomenal expansion of the local pub- 
lic sector adds fuel to this controversy.  Since 
1950, state and local government expenditures 
have increased at a faster rate than either the 
gross national product, federal expenditures, or 
expenditures on private-sector services. State 
and local governments currently claim 17 per- 
cent of  total personal income, in contrast to 10 
percent in 1950. Currently, they spend two and 
one-half times more than the federal govern- 
ment spends on civilian services such as educa- 
tion, roads, welfare, public health, hospitals, 
police, and sanitation. 
How much of this growth is due to govern- 
ment structure and how much is due to other 
factors, such as demand for local services, is an 
empirical question. Even the effect of govern- 
mental structure can work in opposite direc- 
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may increase local public spending due to 
duplication of efforts, but at the same time, 
competition among these units may constrain 
spending. The net effect of our present govern- 
mental structure on government spending 
depends on which of these various factors is 
more important. 
To further complicate matters, there are two 
distinct types of local governments. One type 
provides a variety of services to a subgroup of 
the county or metropolitan population, while 
the second type typically provides a single serv- 
ice to the entire local area. Possible differences in 
behavior of these two government types must 
be taken into account. Two previous studies, 
one by Oates (1985)  and a follow-up by Nelson 
(1987), have estimated the relationship between 
decentralization  and government spending, but 
without conclusive results.' 
The purpose of this paper is to continue the 
inquiry into the relationship between decentral- 
ization and the size of the local public sector. We 
test the decentralization hypothesis proposed 
by Oates, in which an increase in the number of 
governmental units reduces local government 
spending as a percentage of personal income. 
However, unlike Oates (and Nelson), we contend 
that the hypothesized effects will most likely be 
observed at the metropolitan and county levels 
(referred to as the local level), not at the state or 
national levels. We  believe that most of the "disci- 
pline" derived from competition for households 
and firms would be observed at these levels of 
disaggregation, because these levels more closely 
approximate local labor markets within which 
firms and labor are most mobile. Oates (1985), in 
fact, argues that the "discipline" resulting from 
fiscal competition should increase as the geo- 
graphical size of the unit of analysis decreases. 
However, neither Oates nor Nelson uses a unit of 
analysis less aggregated than the state. 
To test our point, we use various levels of 
aggregation from the county to the state level. 
We find solid statistical support for the 
decentralization hypothesis at the metropolitan 
and county levels. Increases in the number of 
1  An unpublished paper by Zax (1987), recently brought to our 
attention, also takes exception to the use of  state4evel data by Oates and 
Nelson. Using county-level data, he finds a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the number of  governments and the size 
of the local public sector. His study differs from ours in at least three 
ways. First, he uses own-source revenue as a dependent variable, 
whereas we use local expenditures  on selected functions. Second, we 
explore these effects at various levels of aggregation, not just at the 
county level. Third, he finds that an increase in the number of special 
districts also reduces the size of the local public sector. We find the 
opposite effect at each level of  disaggregation. 
competing general-purpose  government units 
are associated with a statistically significant 
decrease in the relative income share of local 
public expenditures. At the same time, we find a 
distinct difference in behavior between the two 
types of government. An increase in the number 
of single-purpose districts increases the share of 
personal income going to local government 
expenditures. To further support our point, we 
find that these relationships are not significant at 
the state level, which is consistent with the 
results of Oates and Nelson. 
I.  Competition Among 
Local Government 
Jurisdictions 
The potential benefits of  competition among 
local government jurisdictions  are similar to the 
benefits associated with competition in private 
markets. In the private sector, competition 
induces profit-maximizing firms to provide 
goods or services preferred by consumers at the 
lowest resource cost. The motivating force 
behind this behavior is the choice of suppliers 
available to consumers. If a firm raises its price, 
consumers will switch to the supplier with the 
lowest price, assuming that all firms are identical 
and that consumers incur no additional cost in 
searching for another supplier. Given enough 
competing firms (that is, choices to the con- 
sumer), no firm can set prices above the per-unit 
cost of production. 
The same competitive forces exist among 
local government jurisdictions.  By  law, local 
governments cannot earn profits. However, 
according to Niskanen (1971), public admin- 
istrators may be motivated to maximize revenue, 
and thus expenditures, in order to expand desir- 
able aspects of  their working environment. Pub- 
lic administrators thereby "consume" profits on 
the job instead of taking them home. 
The capacity of governments to increase 
revenues depends upon the customer base- 
taxpayers who live within their jurisdictions. If 
local governments attempt to raise taxes or to 
reduce the level and quality of services, then 
taxpayers will have an incentive to locate in 
neighboring jurisdictions that provide a service1 
tax package more in line with the taxpayers' 
preferences. The loss of  households and firms 
reduces a government's tax base and, in turn, 
reduces its ability to raise revenue. 
Thus, the basis for the constraining  effect 
of decentralization is founded upon the inter- 
jurisdictional competition for mobile resources, 
both labor and firms. The line of argument 
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of structure, conduct, and performance. Applied 
to the public sector, the argument runs from an 
increase in the number of independent public 
jurisdictions (suppliers), to an increase in the 
degree of competition, to a decrease in the 
relative size of the public sector. However, the 
efficacy of governmental fragmentation depends 
on the mobility of households and firms. 
The net benefit of the move determines the 
extent to which mobility occurs or is likely to 
occur. This benefit comes from either the sav- 
ings derived from locating in a lower-cost juris- 
diction or the advantages gained from residing 
within a jurisdiction that provides more or 
better services, everything else being equal. 
The costs associated with choosing between 
local governments are generally greater than the 
costs incurred in searching for alternative sup- 
pliers of  private goods and services. To change 
local governments, a household must change 
residence and incur the costs of purchasing a 
new home and finding a new job, and must bear 
the emotional costs of moving to a new area. 
However, these costs are in direct proportion 
to the distance one must move in order to find a 
more preferable governmental unit. For exam- 
ple, if enough choices of local governments are 
available within the same metropolitan area, 
then the discontented taxpayer may not need to 
change jobs in order to change jurisdictions. 
Consequently, the mobility of households and 
firms increases as the size of the geographical 
area decreases. Therefore, we would expect 
local governments to be more constrained by 
competitive forces at the county or metropolitan 
level than at the state or national level. 
The two empirical studies by Oates and 
Nelson have looked for the constraining effect  of 
competing jurisdictions only at the state level. 
Oates proposes and tests the hypothesis that the 
size of the public sector should vary inversely 
with the extent of fiscal decentralization,  other 
things being equal. He uses the number of 
jurisdictions within each state as a measure of 
decentralization. Using state-level aggregates, 
however, he finds no significant relationship 
between state and bcal expenditures as  a per- 
cent of state personal income and the number 
of  jurisdictions. 
In a reply to Oates' paper, Nelson suggests 
two modifications. The first is to distinguish 
between general-purpose jurisdictions (such as 
municipalities) and single-purpose jurisdictions 
(such as school districts and mosquito-abate- 
ment districts). Nelson argues, and rightfully so, 
that the two types of districts are not compara- 
ble and consequently should not be lumped 
together. The multiplicity of special districts 
within a metropolitan area does not necessarily 
indicate that consumers have a choice, but 
rather that residents are provided several serv- 
ices, each by a different district. 
In addition, since many special districts pro- 
vide only minor services and since nearly half of 
them lack the authority to levy taxes, Nelson 
argues that there may be little incentive for 
individuals to choose between these districts. 
The second modification is to include state- 
mandated programs in the analysis to account in 
some way for differences in functional respon- 
sibilities among jurisdictions. With these modifi- 
cations, Nelson finds the desired systematic 
relationships, but the precision of  the estimates 
is below the usual acceptable confidence level.2 
II. Market Structure of 
Local Governments 
As  mentioned previously, one of  the prerequi- 
sites for competition is a sufficient menu of 
choices offered to consumers. Tallying up the 
number of local governments in the United 
States casts little doubt on the potential for 
choice. According to Aronson and Hilley (1986), 
79,862 governmental units below the state level 
existed in 1977. These units tend to fall into two 
categories: general-purpose  and single-purpose 
governments. 
General-purpose governments, such as 
municipalities and counties, provide a variety of 
services ranging from fire protection to health 
care. As  shown in table 1, municipalities  num- 
bered more than 18,000 in 1977, or 24 percent 
of all governmental units; counties totalled 
3,042, or less than 4 percent. Single-purpose 
units, consisting primarily of school districts 
and special districts, comprise the majority of 
local government jurisdictions. As  noted in table 
1, over 40,000 governmental units have been 
established to provide only a single function. 
More than half of these units are special districts, 
which include sanitary districts, drainage dis- 
tricts, and soil-conservation districts. 
2 Nelson does find the desired statistically significant relationship 
between the number of general-purpose  governments and the size of 
the local public sector using statelevel data. However, in what we take 
as Nelson's most preferred specification, equation (3) and dependent 
variable G*,  the coefficient on the general-purposegovernment variable 
has a tvalue of only 0.91. Thus, although we are in total agreement 
with Nelson's methodological  changes, we do not believe that a clear 




Best available copyThe overlapping structure of local govern- 
ments is far from static. Between 1957 and 1977, 
the number of local governments fell by 22,514, 
primarily from a conscious attempt to consoli- 
date local school districts. The reduction in the 
total number of units would have been much 
Type of Government  Number of Units 
1957  1967  1977  1982 
County  3,047  3,049  3,042  39O4l 
Municipality  17,183  18,048  18,862  19,076 
Township and town  17,198  17,105  16,822  16,734 
School district  50,446  21,782  15,174  14,851 
Special district  14,405  21,264  25,962  28,588 
Total  102,279  81,248  79,862  82,290 
SOURCE: Numbers obtained from Aronson and Hilley (1986),  Table 4-1, p. 76 
greater during this time if it were not for the 
creation of more than 11,000 special districts. 
Between 1977 and 1982, the proliferation of 
special districts continued, while the number 
of other types of governmental units remained 
relatively constant. 
As  expected, local governmental units are 
concentrated in metropolitan areas. We  find that 
counties in Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (SMSAs) have almost twice as many gov- 
ernmental units as do non-SMSA counties-an 
average of  40 compared to 21. The ratio is even 
higher for single-purpose units (2.3 to l), but it 
is smaller for general-purpose  governments (1.6 
to 1). In addition, we find that only 25 percent 
of  the metropolitan areas had fewer than 10 
general-purpose units and 14 single-purpose dis- 
tricts. On the other hand, 50 percent of the 
SMSAs contained more than 21 general-purpose 
units and 29 single-purpose  districts. 
Ill.  The Empirical Test 
The basic relationship to be tested is between 
government performance and market structure. 
The specification and analysis in this section 
follow the lines initiated by Oates and Nelson. 
The principal difference in our study is that we 
focus solely on local government expenditures 
in local labor markets, rather than on the aggre- 
gate of the state and local public-goods sectors. 
Consistent with this focus, we adopt two levels 
of aggregation as the geographical unit of obser- 
vation: the county and the metropolitan  area. In 
addition, as a point of reference to the previous 
two studies, we also estimate the relationship at 
the state level. 
Our data set consists of observations on local 
public-sector characteristics and relevant demo- 
graphic features of  more than 2,900 counties 
and 280 SMSAs in 1977. This year was chosen 
for two reasons. First, it is consistent with the 
studies by Oates and Nelson. Second, some 
information, such as state mandates, was avail- 
able only during this period. We  have analyzed 
more current data on local-government expen- 
ditures for 1985, while still using state mandates 
from the earlier period, and find no qualitative 
differences in the results. 
Variables 
Local government performance is measured by 
expenditures on the major local public services 
as a percentage of  personal income in either the 
county or the SMSA, whichever is appropriate. 
We  include local expenditures on local schools, 
public welfare, fire and police protection, sanita- 
tion, and local parks.3 
The key explanatory variable is market struc- 
ture, which is measured by the number of local 
governments within the appropriate unit of 
observation. Local governments are divided 
into the two classes described earlier: general- 
purpose and single-purpose  jurisdiction^.^ 
Three different measures of  the number of local 
governments are used in the analysis. The first 
measure is simply the total number of each class 
of local governmental units found within the 
appropriate unit of analysis (county or metro- 
politan area). The second method normalizes 
the number of units by the size of  the popula- 
tion served by all of these local governments. 
The third method divides the number of juris- 
3 Nelson did not include police protection in his estimation. We find, 
however, that the results are not sensitive to its inclusion or exclusion. 
4 The number of  general-purpose governments is the sum of the 
number of county and municipal governments, except in Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and the New England states, where townships are also 
included. The number of  single.purpose governments is the sum of the 
number of townships, school districts, and special districts, except in the 
aforementioned states, where townships are not included. The reason for 
the exceptions is that the functional responsibilities closely resemble 
municipalities in these states. 
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SMSA. This last method accounts to some 
degree for the ease of  mobility among the 
various governmental units. 
The other explanatory variables include state 
mandates, per-capita personal income, popula- 
tion, and intergovernmental  grants as a percent- 
age of total local tax revenues. The first three 
variables may be considered proxies for the 
demand for local public services. As  Nelson 
notes, state mandates may impose binding mini- 
mum constraints on certain local government 
activities. As  defined by the Advisory Commis- 
sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 
which collected the data, a state mandate is a 
legal requirement imposed by the state that a 
local government must undertake a specified 
activity or provide a service that meets mini- 
mum state standards.5 The presence of such 
restrictions would, therefore, be positively 
associated with the relative size of  the local 
public sector. 
The demand for local public services should 
be positively related to personal income, accord- 
ing to traditional consumer demand theory 
However, the relationship betweenper capita 
income and government spending as a percent- 
age of personal income has been subjected to 
considerable empirical scrutiny Investigation 
of Wagner's "law" or, perhaps more correctly, 
Wagner's hypothesis of a positive correlation 
between income and government's relative 
claims on that income, has sparked much 
research and has kindled considerable contro- 
versy6  To our knowledge, the empirical studies 
have all involved national samples. Our study 
will provide a simple test of Wagner's "law" at 
the local level. 
An increase in population, holding other 
variables constant, would also be associated 
with a larger local public sector. This result in 
some ways follows the thinking of Wagner, who 
saw an increase in population density and 
urbanization leading to increased public expen- 
ditures on personal protection and economic 
regulation (Bird [1971]). 
The ratio of intergovernmental  grants to local 
tax revenues measures the extent to which local 
governments rely on higher-level governments 
for funds. Because of  the matching provisions of 
many federal and state grants, we would expect 
the grants to stimulate local government 
expenditures.' 
Fourteen separate models were estimated: one 
for each level of aggregation and for each mea- 
sure of decentralization. The estimates displayed 
in table 2 for one of  the models are typical of the 
results found for the other models. We find that 
an increase in decentralization of general-pup 
pose governments, measured by any one of  the 
three measures, is statistically significantly re- 
lated to a decrease in the size of  the local public 
sector. This finding supports the decentraliza- 
tion hypothesis: an increase in jurisdictional 
fragmentation is associated with a decrease in 
local budget share. 
On the other hand, we find that an increase 
in the number of single-purpose units increases 
the local budget share. This suggests that the 
costs of  providing services through special dis- 
tricts outweigh the constraining effects that 
competition may impose on spending or the 
savings that result from economies of scale. 
Thus, our results support the argument that the 
proliferation of special districts has increased 
local spending. 
The negative and significant coefficient on 
per capita income is evidence against the rele- 
vance of Wagner's hypothesis applied to the 
local government sector. At  the state level, we 
find a positive relationship, as does Oates. A 
negative correlation between local public-expen- 
diture share and income is not unexpected, 
however. Most studies of local public-expendi- 
ture demand find income elasticities that are 
significantly less than unity, which implies a 
decline in aggregate budget share as average 
community income rises.8 
The positive coefficients on the population 
and intergovernmental transfer variables are 
consistent with our earlier discussion. 
5 The ACIR surveyed local governments about 77 functional 
subcomponents  in five broad areas: state personnel, other than police, 
fire, and education (15  components);  public safety (31); environmental 
protection  (8);  social services and miscellaneous  (10); and education (13).  1  7 King (1984) offers a comprehensive summary and critique of the 
effects of  grants on local government spending. 
6 Bennett and Johnson (1980) provide a comprehensive summary of 
the debate and a compendium of the empirical results. Ram (1987)  8 lnman (1979) includes a summary of studies of the demand for 
appears to have made the most recent contribution to the literature.  local public services. 
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Number of general- 
purpose units 
Number of single- 
purpose units 
Per capita income 
($1,000~) 
Ratio of transfers 
to local taxes 












Mean  Coefficient 
(Standard error)  (T-statistic) 
28.8  -  ,015 
(40.83)  (4.48) 
SOURCE: Government expenditure data from Census of Governments, 
1977; personal income and population data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis;  state mandates compiled by the ACIR. 
Various Measures of 
Decentralization 
The conclusion that increased decentralization 
of general-purpose governments is associated 
with a smaller local public sector is supported 
by our analysis regardless of which measure of 
decentralization is used. As seen in table 3, not 
only are the coefficients statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level for SMSAs and counties, but 
the magnitudes of the elasticities are also of 
similar magnitudes, with few exceptions. For 
example, at the SMSA  level (column l),  we find 
that a 10 percent increase in the number of 
general-purpose jurisdictions reduces the local 
public sector's share of personal income by 0.6 
percent. In the case of SMSAs, a 10 percent 
increase in general-purpose  governments would 
mean only an additional three units. 
However, when state-level data are used, the 
statistical significance of the estimates falls below 
the 10 percent confidence level. The only excep- 
tion is the effect of the number of general- 
purpose governments, which is statistically sig- 
nificant right at the 10 percent level. 
Table 3 also reveals that the size of the local 
public sector at the SMSA  level is slightly more 
responsive to a change in the number of general- 
purpose governments than to a change in the 
number of single-purpose governments. This 
relationship holds no matter which decentraliza- 
tion measure is used, but is less consistent at the 
county level. 
IV.  Conclusion 
We  have found a significant relationship be- 
tween governmental structure and government 
size. Two basic relationships emerge from the 
analysis. First, an increase in the number of 
general-purpose  government units within a 
metropolitan area or county boundary reduces 
the share of  personal income going to the local 
public sector. Second, an increase in single- 
purpose government units has the opposite 
and equally significant result of increasing the 
size of  the local public sector. 
The difference in behavior between the two 
types of governments underscores our conclu- 
sion that competition among local general-pur- 
pose governments constrains local government 
spending. Recall that suppliers are disciplined 
by the presence of other suppliers only when 
they provide similar services to the same mar- 
ket. General-purpose governments meet this 
requirement more closely than do single-pur- 
pose governments. Typically, a single-purpose 
government is the sole supplier of a specific 
service within a local market, whereas each 
general-purpose  district provides a similar array 
of services. 
Thus, the existing structure of government 
creates two opposing forces of government 
behavior. Competition among general-purpose 
units, such as municipalities,  constrains local 
government spending. On the other hand, the 
overlapping labyrinth of single-purpose govern- 
ments stimulates local government spending. 
Much of  the current arrangement of local 
governments resulted from attempts by states 
and localities to respond to changing conditions 
within the various constraints imposed on 
them. As  a practical matter, states and munici- 
palities have limited ability to respond to chang- 
ing conditions. States are constrained by local 
loyalties, vested interests, and the inertia of the 
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Measure of  County 
Competition  SMSA  All  Non-Metro  Metro  State 
A. Number of units 
B. Number of units per capita 
C. Number of  units per square mile 
Note: Numbers are expressed as elasticities. All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level unless denoted by an asterisk. A single 
asterisk denotes significance at the 10 percent level but less than 5 percent level. A double asterisk denotes significance at less than the 
10 percent level. The estimates are derived by regressing the local government expenditures as a percent of personal income against 
measures ofgovernment competition, population, per capita income, intergovernmental revenue, and state program mandates. 
Estimates of a typical regression equation are shown in table 2. 
SOURCE: Authors. 
status quo. The power of localities to handle 
public services is often made difficult by state 
statutes that limit powers to tax and to incur 
debt. 
Since the late 1950s,  special districts have 
been established as a means of circumventing 
these constraints by shifting responsibilities 
away from general governments. The federal 
government has further stimulated the creation 
of special districts through "direct advocacy;" 
Many federal agencies would rather deal directly 
with officials of special districts than with offi- 
cials from general governments such as counties 
or municipalities (Aronson and Hilley [1986]). 
In the past few years, a number of states have 
begun to take a systematic look at the current 
structure of local governments. Several states 
have established advisory commissions to con- 
sider reorganizing and streamlining the per- 
ceived fragmented system of  local governments 
that dot their landscape. These commissions 
appear to be particularly concerned about how 
the large number of special districts affects the 
provision of services. 
Our analysis provides some information that 
may be useful to these reform efforts. First, our 
results suggest that reform efforts directed 
toward special districts are well-guided. Clearly, 
an increase in the number of single-purpose 
governments, which consist mostly of special 
districts, increases government spending. 
Although these results are very strong, we 
should caution that we have not been able to 
control entirely for differences in the level of 
services provided by these governments. It may 
be the case that part of  the observed increase in 
spending associated with greater numbers of 
units simply indicates that additional special 
districts are providing additional services. 
Second, our results warn against lumping 
together general-purpose and single-purpose 
governments when considering streamlining 
local government structure. We  show that the 
two different types of governments exhibit 
distinctly opposite behavior. 
Third, our results suggest that a competitive 
environment among specific types of local gov- 
ernments can constrain government spending 
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